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rehabilitated along the lines of John Grodzinski’s Defender of Canada 
(2013) despite his shortcomings as an operational commander; and 
Commodore James Yeo, the commander of British naval forces, is 
treated as an impediment to operations, yet he did make significant 
contributions as ably described in Robert Malcomson’s Lords of the 
Lake (1998).
Despite these criticisms, And All Their Glory Past is a fine 
concluding volume to this trilogy and covers the closing period of the 
War of 1812 in an entertaining and lucid fashion. Its breadth and 
scope make it useful to both historians and students alike.
RICH ROY, PHD, INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER
Caen Controversy: The Battle for Sword Beach IQ44. Andrew 
Stewart. Solihul: Helion & Company, 2014. Pp. 164.
Caen Controversy is a narrative account of the activities and 
performance of the 3 (British) Infantry Division that fought in 
the Sword sector on the eastern flank of the D-Day landings in 
Normandy. In order to contextualise the Division’s progress inland 
the book also describes the preparations for the landings, the 
supporting activities of the 6 Airborne Division, which protected 
the left flank of the Allied forces, and it assesses the capabilities 
and challenges facing the German defenders. The book’s aim is to 
analyse the performance of the assaulting officers and soldiers, in 
the context of the objectives set for them, to examine their relative 
success. Stewart’s narrative closes on the evening of 6 June 1944 
when, although a solid lodgement had been secured away from the 
beaches, the objective of Caen had not been taken.
The controversy described in the book stems from an enduring 
perception that 3 Br Inf Div was excessively cautious in advancing 
towards Caen and was affected by an offensive malaise which 
permeated staff and soldiers alike. The French, of course, might 
consider any controversy relating to Caen in terms of the deaths 
of over a thousand French civilians killed by the Allied Air Forces 
bombing of the city in June and July 1944, something that still
1
: "Caen Controversy: The Battle for Sword Beach 1944 (Book Review)" by Andrew Stewart
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
314 : Book Reviews
rankles with the city’s residents today.1 *But unlike John Buckley’s 
Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe, 
Stewart’s version of the Caen Controversy is not a radical revisionist 
reappraisal of the fighting performance of the British troops. Instead, 
it challenges the argument that the failure to take Caen was the result 
of a general lack of ‘offensive eagerness’. Stewart’s analysis adds to 
the understanding of what happened on and beyond Sword beach on 
6 June 1944 by explaining how a combination of factors and events 
conspired to expose 185 Brigade to what seemed to be considerable 
risk. In doing so it explains why the Brigade’s commander, Brigadier 
K. P. Smith, decided not to ‘bash on regardless’ and, instead, to 
methodically take a German strongpoint named ‘Hillman’, the last 
major barrier between the beaches and Caen and by the threat posed 
by reports of German panzers nearby.
What makes this book especially interesting is its detailed 
analysis of a multiplicity of factors that delayed the move inland and 
affected the capabilities of the assaulting British forces. In particular, 
the book describes how the loss of so many officers to sniper fire 
induced a general loss of confidence and offensive spirit amongst 
many of the surviving troops; how the plan was vulnerable to the loss 
of the forward observer responsible for bringing down naval gunfire 
on Hillman; why it was necessary to reconfigure the assault with 
artillery and tank fire support; the impact of beach bottlenecks and 
poor communications which, amongst other things, caused Smith 
to think the Germans still held St Aubin; and, finally, the threat 
of German armour between Hillman and Caen. The combination 
and response to these influences meant that it took seven and a 
half hours to secure ‘Hillman’, which meant that Caen could not be 
reached by nightfall. Stewart’s main focus: the analysis of the factors 
affecting the troops on the ground is very well explained and many of 
conclusions are derived by drawing on primary source material from 
regimental archives, supported to contextualise events by a wide- 
range of secondary sources.
Stewart mainly concentrates on describing the situation faced 
by the soldiers on the ground, and as a result his analysis of the
1 Anthony Beevor, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy (London: Viking, 2009), 266— 
269; Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945 (London: Allen Lane,
2013)i 578—579; 1000 ans d'architecture: Un patrimoine exceptionnel, Caen, Tourist 
Guide.
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roles played by the Allied naval and air forces is relatively sketchy. 
In terms of presenting a more holistic focus of events and their 
repercussions, more detail about the mechanism and the fragility of 
bringing down naval gunfire on strongpoint defences would have been 
useful, particularly as this method of coordinated attack was used 
so successfully in helping to overcome a similar strongpoint adjacent 
to Hillman. Stewart could also have done more to support his claim 
that the air forces did little to assist the inland assault (p.74) by 
analysing the reasons, if any, for the breakdown in the procedures 
and mechanisms to bring down fire from the Spitfires allocated a 
dedicated close air support role to the Sword area (p.141). After all, 
these Spitfires were scheduled to operate in ‘Patrol Line Charlie’, 
almost directly above Hillman.
One of the main reasons the performance of 3 Bri Inf Div was 
questioned was because a main objective of the advance to Caen and 
beyond on D-Day was to secure sufficient territory to build airfields, 
from which the Allied Air Forces could operate their short-range fighters, 
outside the range of enemy artillery fire. Stewart noted the relevance of 
this topic in his introduction and conclusion but by choosing to side step 
the issue in the main body of the book he has missed an opportunity 
to contextualise Brigadier Smith’s aversion to risk in the context of 
Montgomery’s demand for aggressive tactics and his willingness to 
accept almost any risks on D-Day.2 By avoiding the airfield issue Caen 
Controversy is perhaps a little too sympathetic to post-event assessments 
made by the senior army officers involved, those who coordinated and 
produced the official history, and by regimental histories which are in 
general supportive of the actions of its officers and men.
The book leaves a few unanswered questions: if Caen was never 
really a viable objective for D-Day why were orders to capture Caen 
and establish a bridgehead to the south of the River Orne produced 
(p.145)? W hy did General Dempsey, who later claimed that he ‘never 
expected 3 [Br Inf ] Div to get Caen on the first day’ and who claimed 
that ‘if we didn’t get it the first day it would take a month to get it 
afterwards’ (p.151), produce orders that required his Second Army 
was to secure the airfield sites to the southeast of Caen by D+7-8?3
3 Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe ig4§-ig4{j: Success or Failure? (University 
of Michigan: Bnchan & Enright, 1984), 6g.
3 Carlo D ’Este, Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery in the 
Allied Campaign (London: Collins, 1983), 78.
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Stewart alludes to the possibility of subterfuge surrounding the way 
orders were constructed to secure the cooperation of the air and naval 
forces (p. x) by citing the work of one of his staff college students, who 
claimed that Montgomery and his subordinates always thought Caen 
an entirely unrealistic objective.4 If true and taking Caen on D-Day 
was always ‘over ambitious’, ‘unachievable’ and ‘too optimistic’ (pp. 
146-151.) and the bridgehead secured on D-Day ‘a notable feat of 
arms’ another question arises: was why was Smith aversion to risk 
punished by relieving him of his command a few days later?
Ultimately, the details provided in the book give the reader sufficient 
evidence to delve deeper into these issues. The book provides an extremely 
enjoyable and illuminating description of the events and activities of the 
3 Br Inf Div which adds a significant degree of granularity to the events 
that occurred on Sword Beach and further inland on D-Day. By giving 
the reader insight into the various factors that influenced Brigadier 
Smith’s thinking, Caen Controversy has opened up areas for further 
study and discussion. The overall message conveyed tallies neatly with 
other recent work by David French and John Buckley,5 6and would be 
particularly relevant and useful for academics and graduates studying 
the invasion of Normandy, beach assaults and littoral operations as well 
as those enthused by the D-Day anniversaries to find out more about 
what really happened on that fateful day.
DAVID STUBBS, INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER
Canada and the End of the Imperial Dream: Beverley Baxter’s 
Reports from London through War and Peace, igg6-ig6o. Neville 
Thompson. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 393.
Canadians of a certain age will remember Beverley Baxter as the 
author of a regular column entitled “Letter from London” that 
appeared in Maclean’s back when it was a general interest magazine.
4 James Babbage, “Montgomery’s presentation of his plans for D-Day: a case of
consent and evade?” Defence Studies 11, 4 (2011): 657-671.
6 Drench, David (2003) ‘Invading Europe: The British army and its preparations 
for the Normandy campaign, 1942-44’ , Diplomacy & Statecraft, 14: 2, 271-294. John 
Buckley,
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